1942 May: WW2— RAAF Support Battle of the Coral Sea (AI Study Guide)


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1942 May: WW2— RAAF Support Battle of the Coral Sea 


𝐎𝐯𝐞𝐫𝐯𝐢𝐞𝐰

RAAF units supported the Battle of the Coral Sea by sustaining long-range reconnaissance from Port Moresby, maintaining a fragile Catalina outpost at Tulagi, and striking opportunistically at Japanese forces threatening Port Moresby. Crews shadowed convoys, reported movements, and absorbed losses while Allied carrier aviation delivered the decisive blows. Their searches, signals, and endurance helped shield Australia’s approaches and informed operational choices during May 1942.

 

𝐆𝐥𝐨𝐬𝐬𝐚𝐫𝐲 𝐨𝐟 𝐓𝐞𝐫𝐦𝐬

𝟏. Catalina flying-boat: Long-range patrol seaplane; crews conducted night reconnaissance, shadowing convoys.

𝟐. Lockheed Hudson: Twin-engine patrol bomber; RAAF crews flew maritime searches and strikes.

𝟑. Coastwatchers: Australian observers reported Japanese movements, enabling timely warnings and evasions.

𝟒. Deboyne seaplane base: Japanese temporary floatplane anchorage supporting searches; Allied bombers raided.

𝟓. Jomard Passage: Channel near Louisiades; Crace’s force guarded approaches to Moresby.

𝟔. Task Force 44: Australia-led Allied cruiser group screened shipping, countering invasion thrusts.

𝟕. Signals intelligence: Increased Rabaul radio traffic indicated operations, informing Allied dispositions.

𝟖. Rathmines: New South Wales flying-boat base; damaged Catalina reached sanctuary after attack.

𝟗. Port Moresby airfields: Congested staging bases; limited facilities complicated strike coordination.

 

𝐊𝐞𝐲 𝐏𝐨𝐢𝐧𝐭𝐬

𝟏. Port Moresby reconnaissance surge: RAAF Hudsons and Catalinas launched sustained searches from Port Moresby, staging B-17s and American bombers as needed, crowding airfields and straining interrogation and intelligence staffs while tracking Japanese convoys approaching New Guinea and the Louisiades throughout early May 1942, directly supporting the sea battle’s situational awareness. Vol. I, Chapter 26

𝟐. Tulagi Catalina outpost: RAAF signallers and marine staff maintained the Gavutu–Tanambogo flying-boat base under frequent raids; decoys drew early attacks, yet bombardment destroyed facilities by May, forcing evacuation after Catalinas were damaged, one crew flying a crippled aircraft to Rathmines and another scuttling near Guadalcanal before escape to safety. Vol. I, Chapter 26

𝟑. Shadowing and losses: Allied reconnaissance crews, including RAAF Catalinas and Hudsons, reported carrier groups, seaplane tenders, and transports across the Coral Sea; one 11 Squadron Catalina was attacked and lost south of Bougainville, highlighting the risks while shadowing Japanese forces converging on Tulagi and the Louisiades during the critical opening movements. Vol. I, Chapter 26

𝟒. Extreme range constraints: Long distances from Garbutt, Horn Island, Cooktown, and Port Moresby restricted heavy and medium bombers’ fuel reserves and search time, causing many sorties to miss targets despite 87 Allied attack sorties, while emphasising the need for forward bases and longer-range aircraft to sustain maritime strike coverage. Vol. I, Chapter 26

𝟓. Deboyne disruption: After Japanese forces established a seaplane base at Deboyne to support searches and cover, four Mitchells from Port Moresby attacked, damaging floatplanes though the tender had departed; such raids, alongside Hudson anti-submarine patrols, harassed enemy movements and supported Allied carriers manoeuvring unseen nearby. Vol. I, Chapter 26

𝟔. Support to Task Force 44: RAAF search reports aided Rear Admiral Crace’s Australia-led support group guarding Jomard Passage; Japanese land-based aircraft located and attacked his force on 7 May, the only such strikes against Allied surface ships during the battle, while RAAF reconnaissance constrained the invasion convoy’s movements toward Port Moresby. Vol. II, Chapter 2

𝟕. Intelligence network under strain: Coastwatchers reported Japanese advances from Buka to Buin and Shortlands; at Port Moresby, increased Rabaul radio traffic and daily raids coincided with congested airfields, few intelligence officers, and continuous debriefings, yet RAAF reporting fed Allied planning while carrier actions remained unknown to air commanders until after withdrawal. Vol. I, Chapter 26

𝟖. Anti-submarine patrols: On 7 May, one of four RAAF Hudsons on armed reconnaissance south of the Louisiades claimed two bomb hits on a submarine, which crash-dived leaving an oil patch; routine maritime patrols complemented reconnaissance and harassment missions that shaped enemy caution and contributed to convoy withdrawal. Vol. I, Chapter 26

𝟗. Carrier battles decide: Land-based operations hindered Japanese movement but proved operationally inconclusive; the decisive check came from US carrier air arms engaging Shoho, Shokaku and Zuikaku, compelling withdrawal of the Port Moresby invasion convoy, while RAAF searches and signals framed Allied understanding and subsequent basing decisions. Vol. II, Chapter 2

𝟏𝟎. Strategic aftermath for the RAAF: The battle spotlighted shortcomings in basing, long-range striking power, and fighter cover for reconnaissance aircraft; it accelerated Allied development of forward airfields and reinforced RAAF emphasis on maritime patrol, reporting discipline, and coordination with US forces in New Guinea’s approaches during the subsequent campaign period. Vol. I, Chapter 26

 

𝐀𝐮𝐬𝐭𝐫𝐚𝐥𝐢𝐚𝐧 𝐖𝐚𝐫 𝐌𝐞𝐦𝐨𝐫𝐢𝐚𝐥 𝐑𝐞𝐬𝐨𝐮𝐫𝐜𝐞𝐬

 

𝐅𝐮𝐫𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐫 𝐑𝐞𝐚𝐝𝐢𝐧𝐠

𝟏. Weinberg, 1994, A World at Arms, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

𝟐. Stephens, 2001, The War in the Air, 1914–1994, Maxwell AFB: Air University Press

𝟑. Moremon, 2008, Royal Australian Air Force 1941–1945, Canberra: Department of Veterans’ Affairs

 

𝐍𝐨𝐭𝐞𝐬 𝐨𝐧 𝐬𝐨𝐮𝐫𝐜𝐞𝐬

• Official History chapters provide contemporaneous, document-based narratives of operations and command decisions.

• AWM record series and chapter pages use stable identifiers (RCDIG/C-numbers) suited to precise citation.

• Supplementary works contextualise strategy and air power development beyond the immediate battle period.