1920s: RAF imperial ‘air control’ used to police colonies. (AI Study Guide)
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1920s: RAF imperial ‘air control’ used to police colonies.
Overview
RAF imperial air control in the 1920s emerged in the straitened aftermath of the Great War, when Britain sought to govern vast, turbulent colonial territories with smaller budgets and fewer troops. The RAF presented itself as a cheap, flexible solution: aircraft could reconnoitre, intimidate, and, if required, bomb rebellious tribes or settlements. Leaders such as Trenchard and Churchill advocated the method, and it was applied most notably in Iraq, the Northwest Frontier, Somaliland, and Aden. Although often politically attractive and initially effective, its limits became increasingly evident, and by the mid-1930s the practice was quietly abandoned.
Glossary of terms
• Air control was the RAF’s doctrine of using aircraft to police and punish rebellious populations across the empire.
• Imperial policing referred to military actions undertaken to maintain colonial order at minimal cost.
• Strafing meant attacking targets on the ground with aircraft-mounted guns.
• Reconnaissance was the aerial observation of terrain, settlements, or insurgent activity.
• Shock effect described the intended psychological impact of early, sudden bombing.
• Close air support involved aircraft assisting ground operations through observation or attack.
• Vickers Victoria was an early RAF transport aeroplane used to move troops across large distances.
• Northwest Frontier denoted the contested tribal borderlands of British India, now in Pakistan.
• Mesopotamia, later Iraq, was a major theatre of British air control in the 1920s.
Key points
• Origins and rationale: Advocates argued that aircraft could police rebellious regions more cheaply than ground forces, a claim particularly attractive during postwar austerity. Van Creveld shows how Trenchard and Churchill promoted the RAF as a cost-saving colonial instrument, stressing speed, mobility, and the avoidance of expensive troop deployments. Air control promised a technological shortcut to imperial authority amid shrinking budgets.
• Application in Iraq: The RAF took over security duties in Iraq from 1921, using bombers, fighters, and transports to strike tribal rebels, reconnoitre remote regions, and move forces rapidly. Van Creveld notes that an army estimate of £20 million for quelling revolt contrasted with RAF claims of performing the task for £8 million, reinforcing political enthusiasm for the method and securing the service’s independence.
• Northwest Frontier experience: In India, rugged terrain and skilful tribal adaptation limited the effectiveness of bombing. As Olsen’s contributors indicate, rebels increasingly used camouflage, night movement, and shelter construction to mitigate psychological effects. The Frontier campaign illustrated the difficulty of imposing lasting control solely from the air in complex human terrain.
• Somaliland and Aden: Somalia offered a more permissive environment, with flat, open terrain favouring aircraft. Van Creveld emphasises that this apparent success encouraged London to entrust wider Middle Eastern security to the RAF. In Aden and Yemen, aircraft provided long-range patrol, bombing, and liaison across vast areas, helping create an impression of imperial reach at low manpower cost.
• Doctrine and professional thinking: Interwar RAF doctrine identified “operations against an uncivilised enemy” as a distinct category. This framing, noted in the Global Air Power volume, normalised the use of bombing to impose deterrence on tribal societies. Yet it also encouraged a simplistic view of air–land interaction and reinforced the service’s preference for independent air action.
• Psychological effect and its limits: Early air attacks often caused significant shock, but the effect faded quickly. A History of Air Warfare shows how Kurdish rebels in the 1920s and 1930s adapted effectively, developing warning systems and shelters. Repeated bombardment lost coercive power, highlighting that psychological impact diminished as populations learned to counter air threat.
• Moral and political criticisms: Air control attracted criticism for civilian harm and punitive destruction. British officials in India argued that bombing villages created resentment and undermined long-term governance. Such concerns grew in the 1930s, when public tolerance for harsh colonial measures declined. Olsen’s account underlines that political risk became a central factor in ending the policy.
• Operational constraints: Aircraft of the era faced limited endurance, navigational challenges, and difficulties distinguishing combatants from civilians. Van Creveld records naval and army criticism that air attacks were transient, often indiscriminate, and unable to occupy territory. These constraints made air control an unreliable substitute for combined, sustained ground presence.
• Influence on later airpower thinking: Despite extensive experience, imperial policing contributed little to preparations for major war. Biddle’s study shows that RAF officers continued to emphasise the moral effect of bombing rather than lessons from colonial air–ground cooperation or transport. Critical insights from small wars failed to transfer into interwar strategic planning.
• Decline of the system: By the mid-1930s, air control was quietly abandoned as its effectiveness waned and political costs mounted. The RAF shifted doctrinal focus back toward European defence, rearmament, and strategic bombing. The end of air policing reflected both imperial retrenchment and recognition that airpower alone could not deliver durable political outcomes in complex societies.
Official Sources and Records
• Air Power Manual, 7th Edition: https://www.airforce.gov.au/sites/default/files/2021-09/Air%20Power%20Manual%207th%20Edition.pdf
• UK National Archives AIR 5 series (RAF Middle East correspondence): https://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C142
• UK National Archives AIR 23 series (Air Ministry: Iraq Command): https://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C2506
• AWM Official Histories – RAAF (general reference): https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C1417311
Further reading
• Omissi, D. (1990) Air Power and Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force 1919–1939. Manchester University Press.
• Clayton, A. (1976) The British Empire as a Superpower, Macmillan.
• Satia, P. (2008) Spies in Arabia: The Great War and the Cultural Foundations of Britain’s Covert Empire in the Middle East. Oxford University Press.
• Killingray, D. & Omissi, D. (eds.) (1999) Guardians of Empire: The Armed Forces of the Colonial Powers c.1700–1964. Manchester University Press.