1921 Mar: Douhet’s The Command of the Air champions strategic bombing.
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1921 Mar: Douhet’s The Command of the Air champions strategic bombing.
Overview
The publication of Douhet’s The Command of the Air in March 1921 offered an assertive, radical vision of airpower at a moment when aviation remained technologically immature. Douhet insisted that future wars would be decided by pre-emptive blows against enemy cities, industrial centres, and morale, delivered by an independent air force. Although his claims far exceeded the First World War’s limited experience, his arguments found receptive audiences within several air services. The book helped crystallise interwar debates on strategic bombing and profoundly shaped later Western air doctrines.
Glossary of terms
• Strategic bombing described attacks on an opponent’s industry, infrastructure, and morale.
• Independent air force meant an autonomous air arm pursuing its own strategic campaign.
• Bombardment aviation referred to units equipped for long-range or heavy bombing.
• Morale attack denoted targeting civilian will rather than purely military assets.
• Air superiority meant denying the enemy effective use of the air.
• Centralised command referred to control of air operations through a unified headquarters.
• Douhet school described theorists advocating decisive strategic bombardment.
• Industrial web denoted the interconnected industrial targets influencing war production.
Key points
• Origins of Douhet’s thinking: Olsen shows how Italian wartime experiences, including the use of Caproni bombers, convinced Douhet that the First World War’s stalemate proved the futility of land attrition. He extrapolated from limited bombing episodes to argue that only air forces could bypass trenches and strike directly at national will. His theory rested less on extensive evidence than on projecting aviation’s potential into the future.
• Advocacy of an independent air force: Douhet argued that airpower must be removed from army and navy control. Gray notes that this was central to his worldview: only an independent service could plan, resource, and execute a decisive air offensive unfettered by surface-force priorities. This claim resonated strongly with emerging air institutions seeking autonomy in the interwar period.
• Primacy of the offensive: In Douhet’s design, the bomber always got through. Mets highlights that he believed defence—whether fighters or ground-based systems—would inevitably fail against large, well-coordinated bomber masses. Strategic bombardment therefore became the only rational use of airpower, with command of the air achieved not by air combat but by destroying enemy air forces on the ground.
• Civilian morale as the centre of gravity: Douhet insisted that civilians would break under sustained attack. Olsen’s chapters show how his proposed target sets—government, industry, transport nodes, and population centres—aimed to produce social collapse. This presumption of brittle morale ignored the First World War’s demonstrated civilian resilience but dominated interwar strategic discourse regardless.
• Dismissal of gradualism: Douhet argued for short, overwhelming strikes rather than protracted campaigns. Gray observes that he believed wars could be decided within days if the initial bombardment paralysed the enemy state. This emphasis on shock effect foreshadowed later debates on air paralysis, though it underestimated logistical and operational friction.
• Technological assumptions: Douhet’s vision depended on aircraft capabilities that did not yet exist in 1921. Heavy payloads, accurate navigation, and sustained long-range operations were technologically distant, as Olsen and Gray underline. His theory anticipated future aircraft, but the gap between aspiration and reality limited its immediate applicability.
• Interwar influence and adaptation: Mets shows that Britain’s Air Staff, the US Army Air Corps, and several continental theorists adopted elements of Douhet’s work, particularly the belief that airpower could shorten or avoid land campaigns. Yet they moderated his extremism by incorporating industrial targeting theory and limited defensive measures.
• Selective reading of the First World War: Douhet minimised the battlefield importance of reconnaissance, artillery spotting, and air–land cooperation, all highlighted in Olsen. He preferred a narrative of strategic airpower’s latent potential. This skewed interpretation encouraged later air services to underappreciate tactical aviation lessons.
• Moral and political controversies: Overy’s analysis of interwar bombing emphasises the ethical concerns Douhet raised by explicitly targeting civilians. Even sympathetic airmen struggled with the political legitimacy of such strategies. These debates shaped early air control operations and later strategic bombing planning.
• Long-term legacy: Although many of his predictions proved unrealistic, Douhet’s insistence that airpower could strike the enemy’s heart directly influenced Western air doctrine from the 1930s to the nuclear age. His book provided intellectual scaffolding for strategic air forces, leaving a legacy far out of proportion to the empirical foundations of his argument.
Official Sources and Records
• UK National Archives AIR 10 (Air Ministry publications and doctrinal papers): https://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C2114
• AWM Official Histories – AFC and early air doctrine context: https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C1416820
• Italian Air Force Historical Office digital collections: https://www.aeronautica.difesa.it/storia
• Air Power Manual, 7th Edition: https://www.airforce.gov.au/sites/default/files/2021-09/Air%20Power%20Manual%207th%20Edition.pdf
Further reading
• Douhet, G. (1921) Il dominio dell’aria. Rome: La Libreria dello Stato.
• Meilinger, P. (1997) The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory. Air University Press.
• Overy, R. (2013) The Bombing War: Europe 1939–1945. Allen Lane.
• Buckley, J. (1999) Air Power in the Age of Total War. UCL Press.