1931 Sep: US Air Corps Tactical School codifies targeting and bomber doctrine.
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1931 Sep: US Air Corps Tactical School codifies targeting and bomber doctrine.
Title
1931 Sep: US Air Corps Tactical School codifies targeting and bomber doctrine
Overview
When the Air Corps Tactical School refined and formalised its emerging doctrine in September 1931, it marked a turning point in American airpower thinking. Instructors developed a systematic theory of precision bombardment based on identifying critical points within an opponent’s industrial system. They argued that well-planned air attacks on these “vital centres” could paralyse war-making capacity without the need for prolonged ground campaigns. Although grounded partly in assumptions and limited evidence, this codification strongly shaped interwar planning and deeply influenced the strategic bombing campaigns of the Second World War.
Glossary of terms
• ACTS denoted the Air Corps Tactical School, the US centre for air doctrine development.
• Industrial web referred to the interconnected industries sustaining a nation’s war effort.
• Vital centres were the key nodes whose destruction promised disproportionate systemic disruption.
• Precision bombing meant aiming to destroy specific industrial or infrastructural targets.
• Daylight bombing was the practice of striking by day to improve accuracy.
• High-altitude bombing denoted operating above most ground fire to improve survivability.
• Self-defending bomber described heavily armed bombers intended to fight through to targets.
• Centralised control implied that air assets were directed through a unified command structure.
Key points
• Intellectual roots in First World War experience: Olsen’s account of wartime air operations shows how reconnaissance, limited bombing, and early targeting practices influenced ACTS instructors. They concluded that the First World War had suggested, but not fully demonstrated, airpower’s potential to strike directly at an enemy’s war-making capacity. The School therefore sought to turn these fragments into a coherent doctrine.
• Industrial web theory and systemic targeting: Mets explains how ACTS thinkers, including Wilson, Walker, and Hansell, mapped industrial economies as interlinked systems. They argued that certain nodes—power generation, transport bottlenecks, and essential component factories—were more fragile than others. Destroying these would ripple across the system. This became the intellectual core of American precision-strike doctrine.
• Emphasis on daylight, high-altitude bombing: Instructors concluded that accuracy required daylight and that altitude reduced losses. Olsen shows how technological optimism drove the belief that bombers equipped with advanced sights could reliably strike vital centres. These assumptions formed the rationale behind designing “self-defending” bomber formations.
• Rejection of civilian morale bombing: Unlike Douhet’s advocacy of terror bombing, ACTS doctrine sought to focus on industrial paralysis. Gray highlights how the School’s approach diverged sharply from European moral-bombardment theories, believing instead that destroying production would compel strategic collapse without intentionally attacking civilian populations.
• Assumptions about bomber invulnerability: Mets notes that ACTS instructors believed tight defensive box formations and heavy armament would allow bombers to reach targets without escort. This assumption drew only selectively on wartime evidence and underestimated the development of modern fighter defences, but it shaped procurement decisions throughout the 1930s.
• Technological enablers and limitations: Olsen’s chapters underline that the School’s doctrine was ahead of technology. Bombsights, navigation aids, weather forecasting, and bomber range remained imperfect. ACTS therefore theorised future capabilities more than present ones, shaping programmes such as the B-17, which embodied these doctrinal aspirations.
• Centralised command and unity of effort: The School insisted that the air campaign must be centrally directed to achieve cumulative effects. Mets points out that this notion of unity of command anticipated later American air planning, including the Combined Bomber Offensive, where centralised control proved vital for coordination and mass.
• Influence beyond the classroom: ACTS graduates carried its doctrine into senior wartime positions. Olsen documents how key figures—Eaker, Hansell, and others—applied ACTS principles during early USAAF planning in the Second World War. The School thus served as the intellectual seedbed for American strategic bombing.
• Selective reading of industrial vulnerability: ACTS instructors tended to assume that industrial systems were more fragile and less redundant than they truly were. Gray notes that they underestimated dispersal, repair capacity, and operational adaptability. These miscalculations shaped early bombing expectations during the European air campaign.
• Enduring significance: Despite its flaws, ACTS established the analytical and organisational foundations of US air strategy. Its systematic targeting theory, commitment to precision, and faith in airpower’s independent role influenced doctrinal development long after the School closed, leaving an imprint visible in later strategic and operational planning.
Official Sources and Records
• US Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA) – Air Corps Tactical School papers: https://www.afhra.af.mil/
• US Army Center of Military History – Early air doctrine resources: https://history.army.mil
• AWM Official Histories – General airpower context: https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C1417311
• Air Power Manual, 7th Edition: https://www.airforce.gov.au/sites/default/files/2021-09/Air%20Power%20Manual%207th%20Edition.pdf
Further reading
• Futrell, R.F. (1989) Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1907–1960. Air University Press.
• Hansell, H.S. (1986) The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler. Air University Press.
• Meilinger, P. (1997) The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory. Air University Press.
• Sherry, M. (1987) The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon. Yale University Press.