1940 May: Blitzkrieg success depends on local air superiority. (AI Study Guide)
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1940 May: Blitzkrieg success depends on local air superiority.
Overview
• In May 1940 the German campaign in France and the Low Countries demonstrated that Blitzkrieg’s operational momentum depended on achieving and maintaining local air superiority over the decisive axes of advance. Overy, Air War in Europe, shows that Luftwaffe suppression of Allied reconnaissance, disruption of rear-area movement, and precise support to armoured thrusts enabled rapid penetration and encirclement. Gray, Airpower for Strategic Effect, emphasises that temporary, focused control of the air—rather than theatre-wide dominance—created the conditions for operational shock, surprise, and uninterrupted manoeuvre by German mobile forces.
Glossary of terms
• Local air superiority: Control of the air over a specific sector enabling friendly manoeuvre and fires.
• Air interdiction: Air attacks that hinder enemy movement, reinforcement, and supply.
• Close air support: Air action directly assisting ground forces in contact.
• Breakthrough corridor: The penetrated axis where mobile formations advance rapidly.
• Schwerpunkt: Concentration of combat power at the decisive point.
• Operational tempo: The speed and rhythm of combined-arms operations.
• Air reconnaissance: Collection of information on enemy movements and dispositions.
• Air denial: Restricting the adversary’s ability to use the air environment.
• Mobile warfare: High-tempo manoeuvre using armour and motorised forces.
• Rapid exploitation: Follow-on movement expanding initial tactical success into operational decision.
Key points
• Air superiority enabling protected manoeuvre: Overy, Air War in Europe, stresses that German armoured columns advancing through the Ardennes succeeded because local air superiority prevented Allied reconnaissance and air attack. This protection preserved the cohesion and pace essential for exploiting narrow, exposed terrain in the breakthrough sector.
• Neutralising Allied air response: Gray, Airpower for Strategic Effect, highlights that early Luftwaffe attacks on forward airfields and dispersed aircraft denied the Allies the ability to contest key sectors. This suppression allowed German mobile forces to concentrate and advance without sustained aerial interference.
• Interdiction isolating the battlefield: Overy, Air War in Europe, shows how Luftwaffe interdiction severed critical road and rail arteries, delaying Allied reinforcement and preventing effective counter-manoeuvre. These interdiction effects transformed tactical penetrations into operational encirclements by isolating defensive groupings.
• Close air support retaining momentum: German dive-bombers provided precise attacks against strongpoints directly impeding armoured movement. Overy, Air War in Europe, notes that this accuracy prevented Allied defenders from stabilising positions and ensured that German units retained uninterrupted forward momentum.
• Reconnaissance guiding rapid exploitation: Gray, Airpower for Strategic Effect, argues that continuous reconnaissance allowed German commanders to detect vulnerabilities and adjust their exploitation routes at speed. Local air superiority enabled reconnaissance aircraft to operate freely, feeding mobile headquarters with timely intelligence.
• Disruption of Allied command coherence: Overy, Air War in Europe, observes that Luftwaffe attacks on communication nodes and movement corridors hindered Allied command-and-control, contributing to fragmented responses and enabling German forces to divide and isolate defending armies.
• Protection of critical river-crossing operations: German crossings of the Meuse depended on sustained Luftwaffe effort suppressing French defenders. Gray, Airpower for Strategic Effect, notes that uninterrupted air cover allowed engineers and armour to bridge the river with minimal disruption, converting tactical success into a strategic breakthrough.
• Psychological effects amplifying operational shock: Overy, Air War in Europe, describes how unopposed dive-bombing compounded the perception of German speed and strength, contributing to rapid deterioration in morale and accelerating Allied withdrawal from successive positions.
• Economy of effort through local concentration: German doctrine prioritised overwhelming air power at points of decision rather than dispersing resources across the theatre. Gray, Airpower for Strategic Effect, identifies this selective concentration as a doctrinal strength that maximised the operational return from finite Luftwaffe assets.
• Validation of integrated air–ground doctrine: Overy, Air War in Europe, and Gray, Airpower for Strategic Effect, both show that the 1940 campaign confirmed German pre-war concepts of synchronised fires, reconnaissance, manoeuvre, and tempo. Local air superiority proved essential to maintaining operational rhythm and enabling strategic collapse of Allied resistance.
Official Sources and Records
• UK Air Ministry, AIR Series Operational Studies on 1940 Campaigns: https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk
• Bundesarchiv Militärarchiv Luftwaffe Collections: https://www.bundesarchiv.de
• RAF Museum Digital Collections on 1940 Operations: https://www.rafmuseum.org.uk
• Air and Space Power Centre Australia, Air Power Manual ED7 AL0: https://www.airforce.gov.au
• US Air Force Historical Studies (Early-War Air Operations): https://www.afhistory.af.mil
Further reading
• Overy, R., The Bombers and the Bombed.
• Overy, R., Air War in Europe, in Olsen, J. A. (ed.), A History of Air Warfare.
• Gray, C. S., Airpower for Strategic Effect.
• Olsen, J. A. (ed.), A History of Air Warfare.
• Olsen, J. A. (ed.), Global Air Power.
• Van Creveld, M., The Age of Airpower.
• O’Brien, P. P., How the War Was Won.
• Winton, J., Air Power at Sea, 1939–45.
• Mets, D. R., The Air Campaign: Warden and the Classical Airpower Theorists.
• Spires, D. N., Air Power for Patton’s Army.