2022 Mar: Dispersed SAMs and GBAD deny Russia control of the air. (AI Study Guide)
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2022 Mar: Dispersed SAMs and GBAD deny Russia control of the air.
Overview
By March 2022, one month into the full-scale invasion, Russia had failed to achieve air superiority over Ukraine. This failure stemmed largely from Ukraine’s effective use of dispersed surface-to-air missile systems and layered ground-based air defence. Mobility, deception, and disciplined emission control kept Ukrainian SAMs survivable, preventing Russia from conducting the sustained SEAD/DEAD campaign required for air dominance. As a result, Russian aircraft faced persistent threat across the battlespace, were forced into constrained altitudes and routes, and could not deliver decisive operational effects for ground forces.
Glossary of terms
• SAM (surface-to-air missile): A ground-launched guided weapon used to engage aircraft or missiles at range.
• GBAD (ground-based air defence): Integrated network of radars, SAMs, guns, and MANPADS protecting airspace.
• MANPADS: Man-portable air-defence systems widely used by Ukrainian units to threaten low-flying Russian aircraft.
• IADS (integrated air defence system): A layered defensive structure of sensors and weapons linking national and tactical air defences.
• Emission control (EMCON): Measures to restrict radar and communications emissions to avoid detection.
• Shoot-and-scoot tactics: Rapid repositioning of SAM launchers after firing to prevent counter-strike.
• SEAD/DEAD: Suppression and destruction of enemy air defences to open airspace for friendly operations.
• Sortie generation: The rate at which an air force can launch and recover combat missions.
• Air denial: A condition in which both sides deny each other freedom of action in the air despite neither achieving superiority.
• Radar survivability measures: Mobility, decoys, camouflage, and intermittent activation to prevent targeting.
Key points
• Ukrainian SAMs survived Russia’s initial strike package: Russia’s opening salvos targeted known Ukrainian air-defence sites, but Ukraine had dispersed mobile systems, relocated radars, and prepared decoys. As a result, key medium-range SAMs such as Buk and S-300 remained operational, ensuring continued air threat across the theatre.
• Mobility and concealment prevented Russian SEAD success: Ukrainian crews used strict EMCON, short radar activation windows, and immediate relocation. These measures limited Russia’s ability to geolocate and target SAMs, echoing principles highlighted in air-power literature on the survivability of mobile air-defence systems under precision strike pressure.
• Persistent GBAD forced Russian aircraft into constrained flight profiles: With medium- and long-range SAMs still active, Russian pilots avoided Ukrainian airspace at medium altitude, instead flying low to evade detection. This degraded sensor use, reduced weapon accuracy, and elevated vulnerability to MANPADS.
• Layered defence created overlapping threat envelopes: Ukraine combined long-range SAMs with mobile medium-range systems and widely distributed MANPADS. This layering restricted Russian freedom of manoeuvre, illustrating the doctrinal principle that an adversary must dismantle an IADS systematically before attempting air dominance.
• Russian SEAD/DEAD execution proved fragmented and insufficient: Although Russia possessed modern strike systems, it did not conduct a sustained, theatre-wide suppression campaign. Instead, SEAD sorties were episodic, poorly coordinated, and often reactive—contrary to established requirements for suppressing a mobile IADS.
• Radar survivability enabled continued Ukrainian air operations: Because radars were not destroyed, Ukraine retained situational awareness and could cue interceptors and GBAD. This denied Russia the conditions required for offensive counter-air sweeps or persistent loitering in contested airspace.
• Air denial limited Russian strike effectiveness: Russia could conduct stand-off missile bombardment but was unable to use tactical aviation to shape the land battle decisively. This aligns with modern air-power assessments that without air superiority, deep interdiction and close air support become inconsistent and high-risk.
• Ukrainian dispersal enabled recovery and reconstitution: Damaged units could withdraw, repair, and re-emerge. Sustained air campaigns rely on cumulative neutralisation of defences; Russian forces failed to achieve this cumulative effect, enabling Ukrainian GBAD to remain an enduring operational factor.
• Russian sortie generation remained low due to GBAD threat: With no safe operating environment, Russia struggled to increase daily sorties. Limited sortie rates reduced pressure on Ukrainian forces, highlighting the doctrinal link between air superiority, sortie generation, and operational tempo.
• Denial of the airspace shaped the wider campaign: By March 2022, the inability to neutralise Ukrainian SAMs prevented Russia from isolating the battlefield, protecting its ground formations, or interdicting Ukrainian logistics effectively. Modern air-power theory consistently emphasises that failure to dominate the air severely constrains all subsequent joint operations.
Official Sources and Records
• UK Ministry of Defence Defence Intelligence Updates: https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/ministry-of-defence
• NATO Public Statements on Ukraine Air and Missile Defence: https://www.nato.int
• US Department of Defense Briefings on Ukraine Operations: https://www.defense.gov
Further reading
• Hallion, RP 2011, ‘U.S. Air Power’, in Olsen, JA (ed.), Global Air Power, Potomac Books, Washington, DC.
• Gray, CS 2012, Airpower for Strategic Effect, Air University Press, Maxwell AFB.
• Olsen, JA (ed.) 2010, A History of Air Warfare, Potomac Books, Washington, DC.
• van Creveld, M 2011, The Age of Airpower, PublicAffairs, New York.
• Evidence on the detailed conduct of Ukrainian GBAD in 2022 lies beyond the uploaded sources, though their doctrinal insights remain directly applicable.